CASE C OMMENTARIES
CONTRACTS—INTERPRETING THE PARTIES’ INTENT
The Tennessee Court of Appeals held that the State’s merger statute,
Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-21-108, should not be applied to construe the terms
of a contract when the parties expressed a contrary intention in the
agreement. Simmons Bank v. Vastland Dev. P’ship, No. M2018-00347-COA-R3CV, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 321, at *12–13 (June 27, 2019).

Cal Burton
The age-old contracts law question of when the parties’ intentions in
an agreement supersede the statutory law of a jurisdiction was considered
again in the 2019 Tennessee Court of Appeals case Simmons Bank v.
Vastland Development Partnership. In Simmons Bank, the Tennessee Court of
Appeals examined whether provisions in Tennessee’s merger statute
should be applied to construe the terms of a renewal option when the
parties expressed a contrary intention in their agreement. Under
Tennessee Code Annotated § 48-21-108(a)(2), “When a merger becomes
effective . . . every contract right possessed by, each corporation or eligible
entity that is merged into the survivor shall be vested in the survivor
without reversion or impairment.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-21-108. Thus,
any contract right held by a non-surviving entity is transferred “without
reversion or impairment” to the surviving entity. Despite this statutory
language, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that § 48-21-108(a)(2) did
not apply when “the parties to the contract expressed a contrary
intention.” Simmons Bank, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 321, at *12.
First State Bank (“First State”) entered into a leasing agreement with
Vastland Development Partnership (“Vastland”) to lease office space in
the Nashville area in 2003. The lease provided the following renewal
option to First State:
Provided that as of the time of the giving of the First
Extension Notice and the Commencement Date of the First
Extension Term, (x) Tenant is the Tenant originally named
herein, (y) Tenant actually occupies all of the Premises initially
demised under this Lease and any space added to the Premises,
161
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and (z) no Event of Default exists or would exist but for the
passage of time or the giving of notice, or both; then Tenant
shall have the right to extend the Lease Term for an
additional term of five (5) years (such additional term is
hereinafter called the “First Extension Term”) . . . . Adhering to
the same above, the Tenant shall have the right to extend the
Lease Term for an additional term of two (2) five (5) year
options, hereinafter called the “Second Extension Term” and
the “Third Extension Term.”

Id. at *3 (emphasis added by the court). The lease’s default provision
further stated that, “First State Bank would be in default if it was ‘dissolved
or otherwise fail[ed] to maintain its legal existence,’ or upon ‘any
assignment, subleasing, or other transfer of Tenant’s interest . . . except as
otherwise permitted in [the] Lease.” Id.
First State exercised their first renewal option in May 2011, which
extended the lease through August 17, 2016. During this extended period,
First State merged with Simmons Bank (“Simmons”). The merger
occurred in September of 2015, just shy of a year before the lease was set
to expire. Simmons continued as the surviving entity, and First State ceased
to exist separately. Simmons operated on the property throughout the
duration of the lease and attempted to exercise the second renewal option
on January 19, 2016. Vastland refused to renew the lease, stating that the
renewal option was conditioned on the renewing tenant being “the Tenant
originally named herein.” Id. at *4. As First State was “the Tenant originally
named” in the lease, Vastland maintained that Simmons had no right to
exercise the second renewal option. Id. In response, Simmons filed suit
against Vastland seeking injunctive and declaratory relief allowing them to
exercise the second renewal option. Vastland responded with an answer
and counterclaim pursuing declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting
Simmons from exercising the second renewal option, as well as a claim for
unlawful detainer.
Following written discovery, Vastland motioned for summary
judgment, arguing that Simmons could not exercise the second renewal
option as they were “not the original tenant named in the Lease.” Id. at *5.
Further, Vastland argued that even if the court considered Simmons as the
original tenant, that the default provision in the lease prevented the option
from being exercised. According to Vastland, First Bank had entered
default by, “[failing] to ‘maintain its legal existence,’ and [transferring] its
interest to Simmons Bank by operation of law.” Id.
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Simmons cross-motioned for summary judgment and relied on § 4821-108(a)(2) to support their argument that the second renewal option
could be exercised. Simmons made a purely statutory argument that,
“every contract right, possessed by [First Bank] . . . vested in [Simmons]
without reversion or impairment.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-21-108(a)(2)
(2012); Simmons Bank, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 321, at *5–6. Thus, First
State’s contract rights were acquired by Simmons after the merger, and
Simmons should be able to exercise the second renewal option as the
original tenant of the lease. Additionally, Simmons argued that even
though § 48-21-108(a)(1) stripped First State of its “separate existence,”
that First State still legally existed within Simmons Bank. Id. at *6. Further,
as the lease’s default provision used the term “legal existence,” Simmons
argued that First Bank did not default. Id.
The trial court ruled in Simmons’ favor, stating that: “First State bank
continues to exist, not separately, but as a part of Simmons Bank.” Id.
Further, the trial court held that, “the merger statute expressly provides
for an automatic vesting of pre-existing contract rights in the surviving
corporation, Simmons Bank.” Id. at *7. The trial court found that the
provisions of the merger statute, “should not be rendered surplusage by
the general language of the Lease, particularly where . . . the result does
not appear to disrupt any expressed intention of the parties regarding
merger in the language of the lease.” Id. Put simply, the trial court held
that the provisions of the merger statute applied regarding the second
renewal option, as the lease itself did not express any contrary intention.
Vastland then appealed the decision. However, the trial court found in
favor of applying the merger statute because they did not think that the
lease expressed any contrary intention. While Simmons won at the trial
level, the foundational doctrine that a statute will be superseded by an
agreement when the parties express a contrary intention remained and
would be used by the Tennessee Court of Appeals to decide this case.
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s
decision. The Court began their analysis by turning to “[t]he cardinal rule
of construction . . . that the court must give effect to ‘the intent of the
contracting parties at the time of executing the agreement.’” Id. at *8
(citing Planters Gin Co. v. Fed. Compress & Warehouse Co., 78 S.W.3d 885
(Tenn. 2002)). Next, the Court applied a fundamental canon of contract
interpretation, and relied on the plain meaning rule to ascertain the intent
of the parties to the lease. Then, the Court cited to recent precedent from
the Tennessee Supreme Court and reiterated that: “’[O]ne of the bedrocks
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of Tennessee law is that our courts are without power to make another
and different contract from the one executed by the parties themselves.’”
Simmons Bank, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 321 at *9 (quoting Eberbach v.
Eberbach, 535 S.W.3d 467, 468 (Tenn. 2017)). Further, the Court reiterated
that absent fraud or mistake, contracts are interpreted and enforced as they
are written. Rounding out their discussion of the applicable law, the Court
stated that, “with a few exceptions, a statute is not applied to construe the
contract when the parties to the contract express a contrary intention.”
Simmons Bank, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 321, at *9. One notable exception
to this principle is available where the parties’ intentions in the contract
are against public policy.
Applying the principles stated above to the case at bar, the Court
found in favor of Vastland. The Court held that the original parties to the
lease expressed a contrary intention to Tennessee’s merger statute, stating:
The Lease does not state that “Tenant” may renew the Lease.
To the contrary, the Lease contains a restrictive provision that
expressly restricts the right of renewal to the “Tenant originally
named herein,” which is a clear contractual declaration that the
right of renewal was restricted to “First State Bank,” not its
successors or assigns.

Id. at *10–11. The Court read the above language in conjunction with a
specific phrase in the lease’s default provision that triggered an event of
default “when ‘there shall occur any assignment . . . or other transfer of
Tenant’s interest . . . except as otherwise provided by this Lease,’” and
found that the original parties’ had intended to limit the right to exercise
the lease’s renewal options to First State and not its successors. Id. at *11.
The Court then addressed Simmons’ argument that § 48-21-108(a)(2)
transferred First State’s contract rights to them through the merger. As
they had foreshadowed in preceding statements, the Court disagreed with
Simmons’ arguments, stating that they “failed to appreciate the
significance of the parties’ agreement to restrict the right to renew the
Lease to the ‘Tenant originally named herein.’” Id. at *12. The Court found
that this phrase provided a contrary intention to Tennessee’s merger
statute, and thus, Simmons was prohibited from exercising the second
renewal option. Additionally, the Court concluded that:
[R]egardless of whether the Lease was transferred to Simmons
Bank by merger pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-21-108(a)(2)
“without reversion or impairment,” the parties agreed to restrict
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the right to renew the lease to one entity, First State Bank, “the
Tenant originally named” in the Lease. As a consequence,
Simmons Bank does not have the right to exercise the renewal
option.”

Id.
In Simmons Bank, the Tennessee Court of Appeals aligned themselves
with those who prefer to examine the intent of the parties over those who
prefer to apply broad statutory provisions in the interpretation of a
contract. Simmons Bank provides a modern opinion that stands on the
shoulders of the common law rather than blindly following the intent of
the legislature. It reinforces the “[bedrock] of Tennessee law . . . that our
courts are without power to make another and different contract from the
one executed by the parties themselves.” Eberbach, 535 S.W.3d at 478. It
continues to allow savvy drafters to elude the provisions of the Tennessee
Code through clever language and crafty conditions. Some, like Simmons,
may prefer that agreements conform to statutory provisions and be
interpreted alongside them. But, as the Tennessee Court of Appeals held
in Simmons Bank, the parties’ intentions will usurp any contradictory
statutory provision, and are still the foundation for contractual
interpretation.

FAMILY LAW—UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION
AND ENFORCEMENT ACT
The Tennessee Court of Appeals held that exclusive, continuing
jurisdiction does not exist when all parties presently reside outside
of Tennessee and have not resided within the state in the previous
six months. Hernandez v. Hernandez, No. W2018-01388-COA-R3-CV,
2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 371 (Ct. App. July 30, 2019).

Shane Carey
In Hernandez v. Hernandez, the Tennessee Court of Appeals determined
whether a trial court erred by granting a motion to dismiss based on a lack
of subject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”). According to the
UCCJEA, codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-217(a), if a Tennessee court
has made a child-custody determination, the court maintains jurisdiction
unless a Tennessee court or court of another jurisdiction determines that
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the child, child’s parents, and any person acting as a parent do not currently
reside in Tennessee and have not for the previous six months. Also, the
court may not modify their original determination unless it has jurisdiction
to make an initial determination under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-216. For
these reasons, the Court upheld a trial court’s decision to grant a motion
to dismiss based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The pertinent facts are as follows: David Alan Hernandez (“Father”)
and Amber Ada Hernandez (“Mother”) married during 2005. The couple
had one daughter (“Child”) together before they ultimately divorced. It
was undisputed that a permanent parenting plan was part of the divorce
decree entered on October 26, 2006. The plan specified Mother as the
primary residential parent and that Father was to receive co-parenting time
each weekend. At the time of divorce, both parties lived in Tennessee.
However, Father testified that he relocated to North Carolina in 2014, and
Mother testified that she and Child relocated to Alabama at some time
during 2015. In 2014, prior to moving to Alabama, Mother was the focus
of a criminal investigation in Tennessee involving sexual contact with a
minor.
As a result of Mother’s criminal investigation, Father filed two
petitions in the trial court on November 17, 2016. In the first petition,
filed as a “Petition for Temporary Injunction,” Father requested to have
the Mother’s visitation suspended, thus granting him emergency custody
of Child. In the second petition, Father claimed that a material change in
circumstances had occurred since the original parenting plan was entered
in 2006. Father’s grounds for both petitions were Mother’s criminal
investigation, and he alleged that Child was not in a safe environment due
to the criminal nature of Mother’s charges.
On the same day Father filed the two petitions in the trial court,
Mother filed a motion to dismiss both petitions as well as an answer to the
petition which sought a temporary injunction. As grounds for her motion
to dismiss, Mother stated that the trial court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. Although Mother denied all other
allegations within Father’s petitions, she acknowledged that she was
charged in a criminal case but was free on bond and planning to contest
the charges against her. In response to Father’s allegations that Child was
not safe in Mother’s care, Mother stated that while in Father’s care, Child
was placed in situations with a person listed on the Tennessee Sexual
Offender Registry.
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Following a non-evidentiary hearing regarding the “Petition for
Temporary Injunction,” the trial court entered an “Order for Visitation”
on December 5, 2016. Within this order, the trial court granted increased
co-parenting time to Father, particularly over the holidays. In response to
Father’s allegations of Child’s lack of safety, the trial court ordered that
Mother’s co-parenting time should be supervised by Mother’s stepmother
at all times. Similarly, in response to Mother’s allegations, the trial court
ordered that the paternal grandmother must not be around Child
unsupervised.
Although she had already filed a motion to dismiss Father’s second
petition, Mother filed an answer to the second petition on December 28,
2016. Mother stated in her answer that a material change in circumstance
had occurred since the original parenting plan from 2006 (similar to
Father’s argument). However, Mother contended that a new plan was
necessary since the parties lived a significant distance from one another.
In 2017, Mother entered a guilty plea to aggravated statutory rape related
to her previous criminal investigation. Subsequently, the parties
participated in mediation with regards to the parenting plan but could not
reach an agreement. Therefore, the trial court conducted a bench trial and
ruled that Father’s second petition and Mother’s counter-petition should
both be dismissed because the court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.
On July 27, 2018, Father timely appealed the trial court’s decision to
the Tennessee Court of Appeals. Father presented three main arguments
within his appeal. First, he claimed that the trial court had erred by
dismissing on the grounds that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
because Mother and Child did not live in Alabama for six months at the
time the petition was filed. Second, Father argued that, in the event the
trial court properly found that Mother and Child did live in Alabama for
the statutory minimum of six months, then Mother’s behavior in leaving
Tennessee was not justifiable because it was an attempt to avoid
jurisdiction of Tennessee courts. Lastly, Father contended that even if the
trial court did lose exclusive, continuing jurisdiction, the trial court
exercised temporary emergency jurisdiction when it entered the “Order
for Visitation” and therefore erred by failing to specify a timeframe in
which he could obtain an order from an Alabama court.
The UCCJEA, as described in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-217(a), states
that when a Tennessee court has made a child-custody determination, the
court maintains exclusive, continuing jurisdiction unless a Tennessee court
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or court of another state determines that the child, child’s parents, and any
person acting as a parent do not currently reside in Tennessee. Moreover,
a Tennessee court which has made a determination relating to childcustody and does not have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction may not
modify that determination unless it has jurisdiction to make an initial childcustody determination under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-216. To that regard,
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-216 states that, in order for a Tennessee court to
make an initial child-custody determination, Tennessee must be the home
state of the child on the date of the initial filing or must have been the
home state within six months before the initial filing.
First, the Court rejected Father’s contention that the trial court erred
when it dismissed the modification petition based on a lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. In support, the Court referenced several findings of
fact from the trial court’s ruling. The trial court found that neither the
parents nor the Child lived in Tennessee when the petition was filed.
Further, according to testimony at trial, none of the parties involved had
lived in Tennessee during the previous six months. Thus, the Court stated
that, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-217(a), the trial court no longer
maintained exclusive, continuing jurisdiction and was not able to modify
its own initial child-custody determination.
The Court also rejected Father’s argument that Mother’s behavior in
leaving Tennessee was unjustifiable. Father made the argument that
Mother was simply trying to avoid the jurisdiction of Tennessee courts by
moving to Alabama. Additionally, Father cited Mother’s trial testimony and
suggested that Mother moved to Alabama as a result of her undergoing
criminal investigation in Tennessee. The court disagreed, finding that
Mother’s behavior was not causally related and, by stating these facts in her
testimony, Mother was simply trying to provide an accurate timeline rather
than reasons for her decision to move to Alabama.
Lastly, the Court rejected Father’s argument that the trial court
exercised temporary emergency jurisdiction when it entered the December
2016 “Order for Visitation” and therefore erred when it did not provide a
specific timeframe in which Father could obtain an order from an Alabama
court before the temporary order expired. Based on this argument, Father
believed that the December 2016 order remained valid. Upon review, the
Court referenced Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-219, which states that a
Tennessee court has temporary emergency jurisdiction if the child is
present within Tennessee and it is necessary in an emergency to protect
the child because the child is subjected to mistreatment or abuse. The
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Court rejected Father’s claim that his statements to the trial court regarding
the safety of Child were specific enough to warrant the invocation of
temporary emergency jurisdiction. In fact, the Court of Appeals stated
that the trial court did not invoke such jurisdiction at any point in the
December 2016 order because Child was not present in Tennessee at that
time. Further, the Court stated that the trial court did not even mention
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-219 within the December 2016 order, and
therefore could not have attempted to exercise temporary emergency
jurisdiction.
As such, the Court held that (1) Tennessee did not maintain exclusive,
continuing jurisdiction, (2) Mother’s behavior when she moved to
Alabama was not unjustifiable, and (3) the trial court did not invoke
temporary emergency jurisdiction with regards to the December 2016
order. For these reasons, the Court ultimately found that the trial court did
not err in dismissing the motion based on a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and thereby affirmed the trial court’s ruling. However, the
court made one distinction from the trial court’s ruling by clarifying that
the December 2016 order had no effect following the entry of the final
order, which stated the trial court lacked exclusive, continuing jurisdiction.
Thus, as the December 2016 modification order was no longer in effect,
the original parenting plan order from 2006 remained valid until a court
with proper jurisdiction modified the original determination.
Tennessee practitioners should be aware of the court’s interpretation
of the UCCJEA when determining the proper court for matters related to
initial or modified child custody determinations.
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LLCS—VALUATION OF MEMBERSHIP INTEREST IN LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANIES
The Tennessee Court of Appeals held that, in the context of Tenn.
Code Ann. § 48-249-505–506, (1) “fair value” is determined by the
member’s proportionate interest in the company as a going concern,
and is distinguished from “fair market value”, which consists of the
price at which property would change hands between a willing
buyer and a willing seller; (2) discounts for lack of control and
marketability are not necessary for appraising a membership
interest; and (3) tax affecting is relevant in assisting the court ‘s
determination of the fair value of the going concern value of an S
corporation. Raley v. Brinkman, No. M2018-02022-COA-R3-CV, 2020
Tenn. App. LEXIS 341 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 30, 2020).

Issam Bahour
In Raley v. Brinkman, the Tennessee Court of Appeals addressed
multiple issues including the meaning of the “fair value” of a membership
interest in termination and purchase under Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-249503(a). Under the statute, “if the existence and business of the LLC are
continued following the termination of a membership interest under § 48249-505(a) . . . regardless whether such termination of membership
interest was wrongful, any member whose membership interest has so
terminated . . . is entitled . . . to receive from the LLC the fair value of the
terminated membership interest . . . calculated as set forth in § 48-249506.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-249-505(c).
This case arose out of a business dispute between two members of a
Tennessee limited liability company. Plaintiff Terrel Raley (“Raley”) and
Defendant Cees Brinkman (“Brinkman”) opened the restaurant the
Pharmacy Burger Parlor & Garden (“The Pharmacy”) under their joint
venture, 4 Points Hospitality, LLC (“4 Points”). Brinkman owned
Brinkman Holdings, LLC (“Brinkman Holdings”) separately from Raley.
Brinkman Holdings and 4 Points entered into a lease agreement for the
property which specified that Brinkman Holdings would provide the
restaurant building and parking. Each member owned a 50% interest in 4
Points. 4 Points chose to be taxed as an S Corporation. The terms of the
operation agreement required Raley to contribute $30,000 in labor and
Brinkman to contribute $175,000 in cash with an even split of net profits.
Raley was the managing member and oversaw the administrative duties
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and day-to-day operations including payroll and profit disbursement. The
parties disputed the terms of the salary agreement, as Raley alleged they
agreed that he would receive up to eight percent of the gross sales and
Brinkman would receive four percent, while Brinkman claimed Raley
would receive eight percent gross sales and he would receive four percent
gross sales with an additional four percent set aside for the development
of other restaurants. By its fifth year, The Pharmacy had a gross income
of around $3.4 million. Raley opened another restaurant on his own, and
the business relationship between Raley and Brinkman subsequently
deteriorated due to allegations of breach of contract and misappropriation
of funds.
Raley filed a complaint against Brinkman in February of 2016. Raley
brought suit individually and on behalf of the LLC alleging, inter alia, that
Brinkman breached the operating agreement by failing to contribute
$175,000 in capital. Brinkman asserted counterclaims for breach of
contract and breach of fiduciary duty, alleging that Raley had
misappropriated funds for personal use and that Raley had improperly
withheld a portion of Brinkman’s distributions and salary. Brinkman
alleged conversion and sought punitive damages. Furthermore, Brinkman
sought to terminate Raley’s membership interest. The trial court ultimately
found against Raley in breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and
conversion and against Brinkman for breach of contract. The trial court
ruled that Brinkman had breached the operating agreement by failing to
make a $175,000 capital contribution; Raley was liable for breach of
fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and conversion for underpaying
Brinkman’s distributions and salary and for using 4 Points’ funds to satisfy
unrelated, personal expenses; Raley was not liable for punitive damages
because his conduct was not egregious; and Brinkman was not entitled to
attorneys’ fees. The trial court also terminated Raley’s membership interest
in 4 Points and calculated the value of Raley’s membership interest. The
trial court decided to exclude any testimony or evidence pretraining to
discounts for marketability or lack of control. In addition, the court held
that the application of a corporate income tax rate to 4 Point’s stream of
income was not appropriate. Brinkman delivered the first payment to buy
out Raley’s membership interest and appealed the decision.
The Court of Appeals first denied Raley’s motion to dismiss the
appeal after concluding that Brinkman had not waived his right to appeal.
In an email, Brinkman’s counsel clearly stated that a wire-transfer for the
first payment was not to be construed as a waiver of Brinkman’s issues
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with respect to the trial court’s valuation of Raley’s membership interest
or any of the other proceedings in the trial court.
The Court allowed Raley’s membership interest to be terminated
pursuant to Tenn. Code. Ann. § 48-249-503(a)(6)(A) and (C), finding that
Raley was engaging in wrongful conduct that adversely and materially
affected the LLC's business and engaging in conduct relating to the LLC's
business that makes it not reasonably practicable to carry on the business
with the member.
The Court then considered the value of Raley’s membership interest.
The Court held that the membership interest should be determined at “fair
value”, and that “fair value” was distinct from “fair market value”.
However, the meaning of “fair value” was unclear due to the lack of
definition provided in the operating agreement, LLC Act, and the general
ambiguity surrounding the plain language of the term. The Court noted
that the term did not have a commonly accepted meaning in ordinary
usage or in the business industry, and that considering the meaning of
“fair value” in the LLC Act was an issue of first impression. The Court
attempted to ascertain the legislature’s intent and ultimately found that
“fair value” is determined based on the value of the business as a going
concern and not the market price. The Court adopted the Delaware
Supreme Court’s definition of “fair value” as the shareholder’s
proportional interest in the business, valued as a going concern. The going
concern value assumes the company will remain in business indefinitely
and continue to be profitable.
The Court next addressed Brinkman’s argument that discounts for lack
of control and marketability should be applied to determine the value of
Raley’s membership interest. The Court held that the value appraisal was
not simulating a pro forma sale. Rather, it assumed that the interest holder
was willing to maintain his interest and to benefit from that interest. The
Court reasoned that discounts for lack of control and marketability would
be contrary to underlying principles of “fair value”. Furthermore, these
discounts were only pertinent to a valuation based on a theoretical sale to
a third party, and in this case, the company itself was the one purchasing
Raley’s membership interest. The Court also noted that when valuing the
entity in its entirety, courts and valuation experts account for the
company’s lack of marketability.
The Court next considered whether tax affecting was relevant for
determining the “fair value” of Raley’s membership interest. Pursuant to
Tennessee Rule of Evidence 401 and Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-249-50, the
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Court found that tax affecting was relevant for the trial court to determine
the going-concern value of the membership interest. Under Tenn. Code.
Ann. § 48-249-506, the recommendations of any of the appraisers of the
parties to the proceeding constitutes relevant evidence of fair value.
Additionally, the Court found it relevant that Brinkman’s expert
established tax-affecting is a generally accepted practice for determining
the fair value of an S corporation.
The Court next held that contractual rights are not waivable. The
Court reiterated that waiver applies primarily to conditions which may be
thought of as procedural or technical, or to instances in which the nonoccurrence of a condition is comparatively minor. The Court found that
Brinkman’s obligation to make a capital contribution of $175,000 was a
material part of the agreed exchange. As such, the obligation could not be
waived by an act or omission of Raley.
Tennessee adheres to the American rule for attorney fees. In
Tennessee, litigants are responsible for their own attorney fees unless a
contractual or statutory provision create a right to recover attorney fees or
some other exception applies. The Court recapitulated that in the context
of contract interpretation an exception to the rule occurs only when a
contract specifically or expressly provides for the recovery of attorney
fees. Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 48-249-804 and -805, courts may
award attorney fees. It is within the trial court’s discretion whether to
award attorney fees. Under Tenn. Code. Ann. §48-249-804(a), a court may
require the plaintiff to pay the defendant’s reasonable expenses, including
attorneys’ fees, incurred in defending the proceeding, if it finds that the
proceeding was commenced without reasonable cause. A plaintiff acts
without reasonable cause if the plaintiff ’s claims in the lawsuit are not
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law; or the plaintiff ’s allegations in the
suit are not well grounded in fact after reasonable inquiry. Under Tenn.
Code. Ann. §48-249-804(b), the court is given discretion in awarding
attorney fees in derivative proceedings. Tenn. Code. Ann. §48-249-805
gives the trial court the discretion to award attorneys’ fees and expenses in
the event one of the members of the LLC violates a provision in the LLC
Act.
Additionally, the Court refused to award punitive damages to
Brinkman despite Raley’s conduct, pursuant to T.C.A. § 48-249-505 which
demonstrates that punitive discounts are not acceptable “regardless
whether such termination of membership was wrongful”. Punitive
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damages are intended to punish the defendant. The Court noted that in
order to recover punitive damages Birkman had to prove by “clear and
convincing evidence that [Raley] acted intentionally, fraudulently,
maliciously, or recklessly” and that his conduct was “egregious.” Raley,
2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 341 at *28.
This case clarifies the definition of “fair value” under Tennessee’s LLC
Act. The Court differentiates between the significance of “fair value”
versus “fair market value”. Tennessee’s LLC Act was first enacted in 1994
and there appears to be no other applicable rulings providing “fair value”
clarification. The precedent set is an important one for transactional
attorneys and their clients. In the state of Tennessee, there are more active
LLCs than all other business entities combined. If a dispute were to result
in the termination of an LLC membership, attorneys and their clients may
find some clarity from this case in how termination will affect their LLC’s
valuation. Attorneys would also be well served by explaining to their
clients that post-judgement interest accrues from the day a verdict is
returned. This is true regardless of any motion for new trial or pending
appeal. The Court recognized that parties can comply with judgements
while still preserving their right to appeal the decision.

ARBITRATION—CHALLENGING A DELEGATION PROVISION
The Tennessee Court of Appeals held that a delegation provision
within a mandatory arbitration clause may not be enforced if the
validity of the clause is challenged with sufficient specificity. Gibbs
v. Capital Resorts Grp., LLC, No. E2019-00295-COA-R3-CV, 2020 Tenn.
App. LEXIS 78 (Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2020).

Jonathan Russell
In Gibbs v. Capital Resorts Grp., LLC, the Tennessee Court of Appeals
addressed whether a delegation provision requiring the parties to submit
the issue of arbitrability to an arbitrator instead of the courts was
specifically challenged by the Plaintiff ’s, Brenda Gibbs (“Plaintiff ”), claim
of fraudulent inducement. When parties agree to arbitrate the issue of
arbitrability through a delegation clause, the Plaintiff must challenge the
validity of the delegation clause specifically, not just the validity of the
contract as a whole. Upon review, the Court of Appeals found that even
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though the Plaintiff only challenged the validity of a paragraph of the
agreement containing the mandatory arbitration and delegation
agreements, it was sufficient to satisfy the specificity requirement for a
delegation clause challenge given the lack of clarity in the agreement itself.
In August of 2018, Plaintiff entered into the “Capital Resorts Club
Purchase Agreement” (the “Contract”) with Capital Resorts Group, LLC
(“Defendants”) through its sales representative to purchase a timeshare.
Paragraph thirty-eight of the contract included a mandatory arbitration
provision. The provision required the parties to participate in at least three
hours of mandatory mediation prior to filing a lawsuit. Additionally, the
mandatory arbitration clause contained the following provision: “Disputes
under this clause shall be resolved by arbitration in accordance with Title
[Nine] of the US Code (United States Arbitration Act) and the
Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association.”
Id. at *4.
On October 19, 2018, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants
alleging fraudulent inducement. Plaintiff claimed she “intended to sell her
interest in a Capital Resorts timeshare due to financial concerns and the
rising cost of maintenance fees,” and that Defendants offered to place her
timeshare on the sales “Marketplace.” Id. Defendants told Plaintiff “she
should act quickly and that [Defendants] needed to file the documents that
day.” Id. Defendants presented Plaintiff with documents for her signature
and did not give her sufficient time to read the documents. While Plaintiff
believed she was selling her existing timeshare, the documents she signed
actually “traded her existing timeshare as an ‘equity credit’ toward the
purchase of another timeshare.” Id. at *7. Plaintiff alleged that when she
discovered she had agreed to purchase another timeshare, she attempted
to meet with Defendants during the statutorily prescribed ten-day
recession period, but the representative refused to meet with her.
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss and Compel Mediation and
Arbitration, arguing that the arbitration provision of the Contract was
“valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.” Id. at *8. According to Defendants,
due to the agreement’s reference to the Commercial Arbitration Rules of
the American Arbitration Association, which require the arbitrator
determine the validity and enforceability of the arbitration agreement, the
court should not determine the validity. Defendants further asserted that
Plaintiff had not “specifically challenged the delegation provision of the
arbitration agreement.” Id. at *9. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint
alleging that Defendants made false and material representations and
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“[t]hese representations specifically induced Plaintiff to enter into the
‘Mandatory Arbitration’ clause at paragraph [thirty-eight] of the
Contract.” Id. at *11. The trial court denied Defendants’ motion to compel
arbitration finding the amended pleading sufficiently challenged the
arbitration provision.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling that
Plaintiff had plead with sufficient specificity regarding the mandatory
arbitration clause and the delegation provision, citing multiple decisions
of the United States Supreme Court.1 According to the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., a claim of fraud in
the inducement regarding the arbitration clause itself may be heard in
court, but courts may not consider “claims of fraud in the inducement of
the contract generally” where there is a clause delegating the issue of
arbitrability. 388 U.S. 395, 403–04 (1967). The Supreme Court ruled the
plaintiff had challenged the contract as a whole and not the arbitration
agreement, therefore the arbitration agreement remained valid.
The Court of Appeals cited Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, in which the
Supreme Court enforced a delegation provision in the arbitration
agreement because the plaintiff had not challenged the delegation
provision specifically. 561 U.S. 63, 71–72 (2010). Additionally, the Court
of Appeals cited the Supreme Court’s holding in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc.
v. Cardegna, which affirmed that a challenge to the validity of the contract
as a whole, and not specifically the arbitration clause, cannot be heard by
the court and must go to the arbitrator. 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006).
In the present case, the Court of Appeals held Plaintiff had
sufficiently challenged the delegation clause of the arbitration agreement
with specificity. The Court noted that Plaintiff ’s amended complaint
alleging fraudulent representations induced her into signing the Contract,
and “these representations specifically induced Plaintiff to enter into the
‘Mandatory Arbitration’ clause at paragraph [thirty-eight] of the
Contract.” Gibbs, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 78 at *23. Defendants argued
that paragraph thirty-eight contained the delegation clause, but that the
complaint only mentioned the general paragraph and failed to mention the
delegation clause. However, the Court rejected Defendants’ argument
because the lack of clarity and specificity within Plaintiff ’s allegation was
On appeal, Plaintiff raised the issue of whether the Court of Appeals had subject
matter jurisdiction under the Tennessee Uniform Arbitration Act, but the Court quickly
resolved this issue pursuant to T.C.A. § 29-5-319 which gives jurisdiction to hear appeals
from denials of motions to compel arbitration. Id. at 15.
1
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a result of the clause itself. The delegation provision was buried in a long
paragraph, and the Court held it was “incredibly unclear that this clause is
an agreement to delegate arbitrability issues to an arbitrator.” Id. at *23.
Therefore, the specificity in Plaintiff ’s challenge to the provision was
limited by the vagueness of the provision itself.
The Court did acknowledge Defendants’ argument that the parties had
agreed to adopt the American Arbitration Association’s rules which
“provide for arbitration of the issue of arbitrability.” Id. at *24. The Court
also reasoned that the adoption of these rules could be proof that the
parties agreed to delegate the issue of arbitrability to an arbitrator.
However, in this case, Plaintiff was not provided with a copy of the rules.
Also, the agreement used unclear language by referencing “disputes under
this clause” but not explicitly stating that “this clause” referred to the issue
of arbitrability and that those issues would be delegated to an arbitrator.
Id. at *28. Thus, Plaintiff could not be expected to challenge the agreement
with more specificity due to the lack of clarity within the language of the
agreement itself.
The Court of Appeals distinguished this holding from the Supreme
Court’s holding in Rent-A-Ctr. In Rent-A-Ctr., the Supreme Court found
the plaintiff had not specifically challenged the delegation provision
because the contract contained a separated delegation provision within the
arbitration agreement and the plaintiff had only challenged the contract as
a whole, not the specific delegation provision. Id. at *27 (citing Rent-A-Ctr.,
561 U.S. at 71–72). However, according to the Court in the present case,
“Defendants choose to bury the delegation clause in paragraph [thirtyeight] concerning the arbitration agreement, and they must deal with the
repercussions of their action.” Id. at *28. Because the clause was unclear
and buried in the agreement, Plaintiff could not be expected to challenge
the provision with greater specificity.
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals decided Plaintiff had sufficiently and
specifically challenged the delegation provision in the mandatory
arbitration clause because the provision was unclear on the issue it was
delegating, it was buried within a long paragraph, and Defendants did not
provide a copy of the rules it was attempting to enforce. Thus, Plaintiff ’s
challenge to the paragraph as a whole, without specifically mentioning the
delegation clause, was appropriately specific and the trial court did not err
in denying Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration.
In light of this holding, transactional attorneys in Tennessee should
ensure clarity when drafting arbitration agreements, particularly in drafting
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delegation clauses. First, validity concerns should be resolved at the time
of contracting. Additionally, parties should be given time to thoroughly
read the documents. If the agreement references external rules such as the
American Arbitration Association’s rules, provide a copy of those rules
with the contract. Further, in anticipating challenges to the validity of
drafted arbitration agreements, separate the provisions of the arbitration
agreement into sections, so that if a specific arbitration issue is in question,
particularly the issue of delegation, the court uses lack of clarity as a factor
in refusing to enforce the provision.

BANKRUPTCY—CREDITOR’S MOTION FOR RELIEF
FROM AN AUTOMATIC STAY
The Supreme Court of the United States held that a bankruptcy
court order resolving a creditor’s motion for relief from an
automatic stay is a distinct proceeding, final and immediately
appealable. Ritzen Grp., Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 582 (2020).

Jonathan Davis
In Ritzen Grp., Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, the Supreme Court of the
United States addressed whether denial of a creditor’s motion for relief
from an automatic stay is a distinct proceeding, final and immediately
appealable upon the ruling of a bankruptcy court. Typically, as understood
within civil proceedings, a final court order is one that resolves an entire
case. However, bankruptcy cases are different in that they often involve
multiple resolutions that might resemble independent cases outside the
context of bankruptcy. Ritzen Grp., Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, 140 S. Ct.
582, 586 (2020) (citing Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U.S. 496 (2015)). This
is an important distinction between bankruptcy and civil cases because the
designation of an order as final can affect when and how it can be
appealed. 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(2) and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure 8002(a) allow fourteen days for a party to appeal a final order
from a bankruptcy court. The Supreme Court held that a bankruptcy court
order denying a creditor’s motion for relief from an automatic stay is a
distinct proceeding, final and immediately appealable. The primary
ramification of this holding is that creditors hoping to appeal an order
denying relief from an automatic stay must do so within 14 days of the
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order to prevent being barred from pursuing claims outside of the
bankruptcy forum.
Ritzen Group, Inc. (“Ritzen”) contracted to buy land in Nashville,
Tennessee from Jackson Masonry, LLC (“Jackson”). The sale never
happened and Ritzen sued for a breach of contract in Tennessee state
court. The breach-of-contract case lasted for over a year, and days before
trial Jackson filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. 362(a) states that
filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy acts as an automatic stay. An automatic
stay requires all claims against a debtor to be resolved within the
bankruptcy forum.
In the Federal Bankruptcy Court, Ritzen filed a motion for relief from
the stay which would allow it to resume claims against Jackson in
Tennessee state court. Ritzen argued that “relief would promote judicial
economy and that Jackson had filed for bankruptcy in bad faith.” Id. at
587. However, the Bankruptcy Court denied the motion for relief and
instead of appealing the court’s order, Ritzen sought a proof of claim
against Jackson’s bankruptcy estate based on the initial breach-of-contract
claim. The court found for Jackson and dismissed the claim. Without
objection, the Bankruptcy Court then confirmed Jackson’s reorganization
plan, permanently preventing new or continued proceedings brought by
creditors outside of the forum of bankruptcy.
Ritzen filed notices of appeal in the Middle District of Tennessee for
both denial of relief from the automatic stay and the initial breach-ofcontract claim. The District Court held that the appeal for relief from the
automatic stay was made outside of the 14-day period allowed for “final
orders” under 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(2) and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure 8002(a). Id. The District Court held that Ritzen would have had
to appeal within fourteen days of the Bankruptcy Court’s order denying
relief from the automatic stay. It also ruled against Ritzen on the merits
of the breach-of-contract claim.
Ritzen then appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
The Court affirmed each of the District Court’s dispositions, holding that
“[a]djudication of Ritzen’s motion for relief from the automatic stay
qualified as a discrete ‘proceeding,’ commencing with the filing of the
motion, followed by procedural steps, and culminating in a [dispositive]
decision based on the application of a legal standard.” Id. (quoting In re
Jackson Masonry, LLC, 906 F.3d 494, 499–500 (2018)). Therefore, under 28
U.S.C. § 158(c)(2) and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 8002(a),
Ritzen had 14 days to appeal, starting with the denial of its motion for
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relief. In agreement with the Middle District of Tennessee, the Court of
Appeals held that Ritzen’s appeal was untimely.
The Supreme Court of the United States then granted certiorari to
resolve whether a creditor’s motion for relief from an automatic stay is a
distinct proceeding, final and immediately appealable upon the ruling of a
bankruptcy court. The Court first reviewed “finality” by recalling Bullard
v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U.S. 496 (2015), a previous Supreme Court case. Id.
at 558. In Bullard, the Court held that an order rejecting a bankruptcy
payment plan proposal was not final because the process of creating a
bankruptcy payment plan typically “involves back and forth negotiations.”
Id. In contrast to payment plan proposals that typically involve “back and
forth negotiations,” most circuits treat a denial for relief of stay as “final,
immediately appealable decisions.” Id. at 589.
Ritzen claimed that an order denying relief from an automatic stay is
simply a small step towards resolving a creditor’s claims within the
bankruptcy case, while Jackson argued that it is a “distinct proceeding.” Id.
However, the Court agreed with the Sixth Circuit and Jackson, the
resolution of a motion for relief from an automatic stay is “an
independent ‘proceeding’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 158(a).” Id.
The Court reasoned that there is an entirely separate process for
determining whether a creditor may obtain relief from an automatic stay.
Often, this process is even governed by state law. Further, separate
sections of the United States Code, while not directly applicable to the
issue at hand, reference motions relating to automatic stays as “core
proceedings,” an indication of congress’s intent. Id.; 28 U.S.C. §§
157(b)(2)(G), 158(a).
Ritzen argued that if the Court were to adopt Jackson’s view, it would
be dividing the case into too many parts. Further, Ritzen argued that its
motion would ultimately decide the forum for the case, making it merely
one step in the resolution of its claims against Jackson. The Court agreed
that a bankruptcy case should not be divided into too many parts, but the
issue was already addressed in Bullard. The Court found that “[t]he
concept of finality cannot stretch to cover, for example, an order resolving
a disputed request for an extension of time.” Id. (citing Bullard, 575 U.S. at
496). However, the Court also pointed out that Ritzen underestimated the
impact of a motion for relief from an automatic stay, finding that it is not
merely one step in the resolution of its claims. The denial of such a motion
impacts not only the claims of the creditor but also the resolution of
claims by other parties against the debtor.
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The fact that the motion will determine the forum for the case is also
not persuasive in determining the finality of a ruling on the motion.
Orders denying use of a forum, such as one denying personal jurisdiction,
are final.
Additionally, some parties file a motion for relief from an automatic
stay without the ability to pursue claims outside of the bankruptcy forum.
Therefore, the reason for filing the motion does not always concern
forum. The Court noted that “motions for stay relief may, for example,
seek permission to repossess or liquidate collateral, to terminate a lease, or
to set off debts.” Id. at 591. The Court concluded that there would be “no
good reason to treat stay adjudication as the relevant ‘proceeding’ in only
a subset of cases.” Id.
Ritzen then argued that the order should not be treated as final based
on its allegation that Jackson filed for bankruptcy in bad faith. Therefore,
the bankruptcy court’s decision “turns on a substantive issue that may be
raised later in the litigation.” Id. However, the Court found that “[U.S.C.]
[s]ection 158(a) asks whether the order in question terminates a procedural
unit separate from the remaining case, not whether the bankruptcy court
has preclusively resolved a substantive issue.” Id.
Finally, Ritzen argued that dividing bankruptcy cases into different
parts is inefficient. However, the Court disagreed, holding that
“[c]lassifying as final all orders conclusively resolving stay-relief motions
will avoid, rather than cause, ‘delays and inefficiencies.’” Id. (citing Bullard,
575 U.S. at 504). The Court pointed out that the present case is actually
indicative of inefficiencies that could result if appeals were not required
to be brought soon after a motion for relief of an automatic stay was
rejected. Each party has engaged in extensive litigation, Jackson’s
reorganization plan has been finalized, and “Ritzen seeks to return to
square one . . . to relitigate the opposing contract claims in state court.” Id.
Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court unanimously affirmed
the decisions of both the Middle District of Tennessee and the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The Court held that a bankruptcy court
order denying a creditor’s motion for relief from an automatic stay is a
distinct proceeding, final and immediately appealable.
The primary ramification of this holding is that upon denial of a
motion for relief from an automatic stay, creditors should immediately
appeal if warranted. Creditors will have 14 days from the time of a
bankruptcy court’s order denying relief from an automatic stay. Failure to

182

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 22

appeal an order denying relief from an automatic stay is will ensure that a
creditor will be limited to pursuing claims within the forum of bankruptcy.

COVENANTS—WHEN A SUCCESSOR CAN MODIFY A
RESTRICTIVE COVENANT
The Arizona Court of Appeals held that a successor to a declarant
of a deed cannot modify a restrictive covenant that requires the
operating of a golf course. Swain v. Bixby Village Golf Course, Inc., 450
P.3d 270 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019).

Robert Fristche
The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed both (1) the trial court’s
judgment that defendant TTLC Ahwatukee Lakes Investors, LLC
(“TTLC”) (a) was not entitled to modify the declarant’s deed, (b) had
breached the Conditions, Covenants, and Restrictions (CCRs), and (c) had
breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (2) the
grant of the injunction. The Court of Appeals focused its discussion on
the interpretation of the 1992 deed restriction, the modification of the
declaration, and the granting of the permanent injunction. The Plaintiffs,
Linda W. Swain and Eileen T. Breslin (“Plaintiffs”), own property that
borders or features the Lakes Golf Course. Defendant, TTLC (“TLLC”),
was an investment company that bought the Lakes Golf Course Property
from Defendant, Bixby Village Golf Course Inc., (“Bixby”), in 2015,
intending to convert it into a residential community.
The Declarant, Chicago Title Agency of Arizona, Inc. (“Declarant”),
is the original owner of the Lakes Golf Course and the Country Club
Golf Course. In November 1992, the Declarant recorded a Declaration
of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements (“CC&R”)
covering both golf courses for mutual benefit of the “Declarant and all
present and future owners” and “any owner of property located within
the Ahwatukee master planned community”—the “Benefitted Persons.”
Swain, 450 P.3d at 272. Through this transaction, the Declarant intended
to comply with requirements of the covenants to gain the benefits of
Arizona Revised Statute § 42-146. Bixby purchased the golf courses in
June 2006 and subsequently leased them to Ahwatukee Golf Properties,
LLC (“AGP”), a limited liability company owned by Bixby’s president and
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his wife. Included in the lease was a provision that AGP operate the golf
courses. Despite attempting to restore the golf course, Bixby later closed
and dismantled the Lakes Golf Course, placed a barbed wire fence around
it, and discontinued certain maintenance procedures; leaving the property
behind the homes “a dead, desolate ‘wasteland’” in Swain’s opinion. Id. at
274. Bixby then entered into a contract to sell the Lakes Golf Course to
TTLC in May 2015. TTLC intended to convert the property into a
residential community and acknowledged that it was aware Bixby had
stopped using the property as a golf course and that litigation was pending.
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss all claims against Bixby
without prejudice. The Plaintiffs then amended their complaint to name
TTLC as the defendant and to add claims for injunctive relief, breach of
contract, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The
trial court denied TTLC’s motion for summary judgment and granted
Plaintiffs’ cross motion, finding “that the Declaration requires the
operation of a golf course for the benefit of those the Declaration
described as benefitted persons and that the covenant did not violate the
Thirteenth Amendment.” Id. at 273. Finally, the trial court declared that
TTLC was not entitled to modify the covenant, and that it had breached
both the CC&Rs and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
TTLC appealed the final judgment, and the Court of Appeals reviewed de
novo the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and the interpretation
of restrictive covenants and other covenants.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals first addressed the construction
of restrictive covenants. This was not a novel issue of law for the Arizona
Court of Appeals, as earlier decisions prior to Powell stated that restrictive
covenants must be strictly construed in favor of free use of the land and
against any restriction, but this is not the case after Powell. Powell, 125 P.3d
373, 376 (Ariz. 2006). The Court noted that Powell v. Washburn established
that restrictive covenants in Arizona should be construed “to give effect
to the intentions of the parties ascertained from the language used in the
instrument, or the circumstances surrounding creation of the servitude,
and to carry out the purpose for which it was created.” Powell v. Washburn,
125 P.3d 373, 376-77 (Ariz. 2006) (quoting Restatement (third) of Property
§ 4.1(1)).
Applying the Powell holding to the facts of this case, the Court of
Appeals asserted that the covenant in question was intended to require the
continuous operation of a golf course on the property, and thus TTLC
could not continue to remain idle and leave the property barren. A golf
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course was an important amenity for the homeowners, and the restriction
in the covenant providing for the operation of a golf course was
intentionally included in the CC&Rs in 1992 to benefit homeowners.
These CC&Rs and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
required that TTLC “not impair the rights of the others to receive the
benefit of a golf course in the community per the agreement.” Swain, 450
P.3d at 275. The Court recognized that the agreement had two equally
important purposes: first, to maintain the property so that it qualified
under A.R.S. §§ 42-125.01; and second, to protect the benefitted persons’
interest in living next to or having views of a golf course. Thus, the Court
decided not to construe the covenant in TTLC’s favor as such a
determination would impair the rights of the plaintiff homeowners. The
Court of Appeals rejected TTLC’s construction of the covenant as an
inequitable solution after finding that a deteriorating greenway did not
have the same value to homeowners as a golf course.
The Court of Appeals next addressed whether TTLC had the
contractual right to make a modification of the covenant because TTLC
argued that a material change in the conditions or circumstances had
occurred. TTLC asserted that Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v. Kitchukov,
should apply to this case, but the Court distinguished the facts in the
present case from Tierra by noting that there was a clear difference in the
status and authority of the parties attempting to modify the covenant. See
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173
(App. 2007).
The Court of Appeals rejected TTLCs argument that the terms of the
contract gave TTLC unfettered discretion to determine whether a material
change in conditions or circumstances had occurred. The holding of Tierra
did not govern this contract because the Tierra case involved a CC&R that
specifically gave a party to the original covenant, the community
association, the sole and absolute discretion to determine whether
modification of property within the community was appropriate. Swain,
450 P.3d at 277 (citing Tierra, 216 Ariz. at 197). In contrast, TTLC was not
an original party to the CC&Rs and attempted to modify the covenant
itself, not property subject to a covenant. Thus, it was clear to the Court
that the community association in Tierra had sole and absolute discretion
to determine whether a modification violated or satisfied the Declaration’s
guidelines, while TTLC did not possess that sole discretion for
modification and declaration under the terms of its CC&Rs.
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The Court held that in order to allow TTLC to modify the covenant,
TTLC must prove that the redevelopment of a golf course was so
economically unstable that it justified a material change so fundamental or
radical that it defeated the covenant’s purpose. Swain, 450 P.3d at 277.
Before considering the evidence in support of material change, the Court
also rejected the argument that TTLC could rely on unprofitability to
prove material change, as those economic conditions were known to
TTLC at the time of the purchase. Both the Plaintiffs and TTLC had
presented evidence regarding whether the redevelopment of the golf
course was economically feasible; however, the trial court found that the
Plaintiffs’ experts’ assertion that the development was not only
economically feasible but also likely profitable was more persuasive.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals accepted the trial court’s determination,
holding that the necessary redevelopment of the golf course did not
constitute a material change.
The third issue on appeal dealt with the trial court’s granting a
permanent injunction. The Court of Appeals found that Flying Diamond
Airpark, LLC v. Meienberg was relevant to whether the injunction was
appropriate in determining “whether a covenant should be enforced
depends on equitable considerations” through the weighing of factors
“such as the parties’ relative hardships, the parties’ misconduct, public
interest, and adequacy of other remedies.” 156 P.3d 1149, 1152 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2007). The Court of Appeals also addressed TTLC’s argument that
an injunction in this case would violate the 13th amendment of the United
States Constitution by citing Butler v. Perry with respect to involuntary
servitude. See 240 U.S. 328, 322 (1916).
The Court of Appeals applied the equitable considerations factors
from Flying Diamond Airpark and determined that the trial court did not
err in its determination that an injunction was appropriate. The evidence
demonstrated that the Plaintiffs would continue to suffer considerable
hardship if the injunction was denied, as the Plaintiffs relied on the fact
that the owners of the Lakes Golf Course property would continue to
maintain and operate it as a golf course. A golf course in close proximity
to their property provided certain benefits to the Plaintiffs, and if the
injunction was not granted, the Plaintiffs would instead be forced to suffer
the hardship of living next to a now fenced-off “stench-filled wasteland.”
Swain, 450 P.3d at 278. TTLC’s hardship in comparison was a minor and
merely economic struggle. The Court of Appeals particularly noted that
beyond the fact that TTLC had failed to prove economic hardship, the
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court in Shalimar Ass’n v. D.O.C. Enters., Ltd. held that “economic hardship
alone cannot serve as a basis for abrogating a restrictive covenant and
rendering its enforcement inequitable.” 688 P.2d 682, 691 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1984).
In conclusion, The Court of Appeals did not permit TTLC to avoid
its restrictive covenant because this was the exact risk it had bargained for
in the transaction. Throughout the proceedings, there was no doubt TTLC
knew that a lawsuit might prevent it from converting the golf course
property to a retirement community. Thus, given the trial court’s emphasis
on seeking an equitable solution and TTLC’s failure to provide adequate
evidence that the circumstances for the redevelopment of a golf course
were enough to warrant materially changing the declaration and covenants,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling.
This particular case will likely impact attempts to modify restrictive
covenants in Arizona as the Arizona Court of Appeals clearly disfavored
TTLC’s argument that economic hardship warrants modification of an
agreement. A defendant who did not have the same level of knowledge as
TTLC, or one with far stronger evidence demonstrating economic
hardship, may be able to escape such a restrictive covenant, but this case
should serve as a warning to parties who try to do so. The terms of the
declaration were clear in this case, and as successor owner, TTLC needed
to comply with the restrictive covenants that established that the property
should be operated as a golf course.
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BANKRUPTCY—INTERNATIONAL COMITY
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York held that dismissal on the grounds of international comity is
particularly appropriate when the claim is based on foreign
bankruptcy proceedings, so long as affording comity does not
violate fundamental standards of procedural fairness or violate any
laws or public policies of the United States. EMA GARP Fund v.
Banro Corp., No. 18 Civ. 1986 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2019).

Andrew Gaither
In EMA GARP Fund v. Banro Corp., the Southern District of New
York (“S.D.N.Y.”) addressed whether it was appropriate to dismiss EMA
GARP Fund’s (“EMA”) claims alleging securities fraud against Banro
Corporation (“Banro”) and Banro’s CEO, John Clarke (“Clarke”), based
on the grounds of international comity for Canada’s bankruptcy
proceedings. Banro is a corporation headquartered and incorporated in
Canada. Under established Second Circuit precedent it is appropriate for
U.S. courts to afford deference to foreign courts when the claims at issue
are part of parallel bankruptcy proceeding. Royal & Sun Alliance Ins. Co. of
Can. v. Century Int’l Arms, Inc., 466 F.3d 88, 92–93 (2d Cir. 2006). Even
though comity is particularly appropriate for foreign bankruptcy
proceedings, the Court must first perform a multi-factor analysis to
determine whether the foreign court’s bankruptcy proceedings satisfies
“fundamental concepts of procedural fairness.” If the court finds that the
foreign court’s proceedings do satisfy the “fundamental concepts of
procedural fairness”, the court should then determine “whether affording
comity would ‘violate any laws or public policies of the United States”.
Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. Linger Group Ltd., 994 F.2d 996, 1000 (2d Cir. 1993).
The S.D.N.Y. held that dismissal of EMA’s claims against both Clarke and
Banro on the basis of international comity was appropriate, because the
proceedings satisfied fundamental standards of procedural fairness and
did not violate United States law or policy.
On December 22, 2017, Banro began reorganization proceedings
pursuant to Canada’s Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C.
1985, c. C-36 (“Banro CCAA Proceeding”). The CCAA court issued a bar
date deadline of March 6, 2018, by which all claimants must have filed
claims with the court. The CCAA court did not receive any claims from
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EMA by the bar date. EMA conceded that it was aware of the Banro
CCAA Proceedings and deadlines. On March 5, 2018, EMA decided to
file suit in the S.D.N.Y. rather than participate in the CCAA proceedings.
On March 27, 2018, the CCAA court approved Banro’s reorganization
plan and issued the Sanction Order, releasing all equity claims against
Banro and its directors, including those of EMA. The CCAA court barred
EMA’s claim against Clarke because of “non-compliance with the Claims
Procedure Order.” On May 18, 2018, Banro and Clarke moved to dismiss
the claims pending in the S.D.N.Y. based on grounds of international
comity.
The Court began by acknowledging that in the Second Circuit
dismissal of actions based on international comity for bankruptcy cases is
particularly appropriate under Allstate Life Insurance Company v. Linger Group
Limited, 994 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1993). The court assessed whether the Banro
CCAA Proceeding satisfied fundamental standards of procedural fairness
applying the eight factor Allstate test. The eight factors to consider are:
(1) Whether creditors of the same class are treated equally in
the distribution of assets; (2) whether the liquidators are
considered fiduciaries and are held accountable to the court; (3)
whether creditors have the right to submit claims which, if
denied, can be submitted to bankruptcy court for adjudication;
(4) whether the liquidators are required to give notice to the
debtors potential claimants; (5) whether there are provisions for
creditors meetings; (6) whether a foreign country’s insolvency
laws favor its own citizens; (7) whether all assets are marshalled
before one body for centralized distribution; and (8) whether
there are provisions for an automatic stay and for the lifting of
such stays to facilitate the centralization of claims.

Allstate, 994 F.2d at 999.
The Court held that the Banro CCAA Proceeding did satisfy
fundamental standards of procedural fairness because it “treat[ed]
creditors equally within separate classes; provide[d] for a monitor,
satisfying the fiduciary requirement; permit[ted] creditors to submit claims
and appeal denials of those claims; and provide[d] a court imposed stay.”
Further, the court determined that the CCAA Proceedings were
particularly fair to EMA because EMA had ample knowledge of the
ongoing proceedings, the stay imposed by the Banro CCAA Proceedings,
the claims and objections procedures, and the hearing on the
extinguishment of their claims.

2020]

CASE COMMENTARIES

189

Next, the Court determined that the Banro CCAA Proceeding was a
parallel proceeding because it was “a forum in which Plaintiffs could have
and should have pursued their claim.” The Court held that the “Banro
CCAA Proceeding was a parallel proceeding that extinguished Plaintiff ’s
claims independent of any conduct taken by Defendants after the filing
of this action.”
EMA then asserted that the Canadian court lacked personal
jurisdiction over them and thus the stay issued in the Banro CCAA
Proceeding did not bind them. The Court dismissed EMA’s personal
jurisdiction argument noting that the Canadian court’s lack of personal
jurisdiction was irrelevant to the issue of whether to grant comity. Further,
the Court reasoned that the dismissal would not cause undue prejudice to
EMA, because it chose not to participate in the Banro CCAA Proceeding.
Next the Court determined that dismissal of the action would not
violate U.S. law or public policy, because under DiRenzo v. Phillip Services
Corporation, Canadian courts are still adequate forums despite differences
in security law. 232 F.3d 49, 58-60 (2d Cir. 2000), vacated on other grounds, 294
F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2002). The Court further held that the Banro CCAA
Proceeding had provided an adequate forum for EMA to raise their claims.
The Court then pivoted to the dismissal of EMA’s claims against
Clarke. Banro and Clarke argued that the claims against Clarke related to
his role as CEO of Banro and thus should have been adjudicated as part
of the CCAA Proceedings. Banro and Clarke further argued that allowing
the claims against Clarke to proceed despite their dismissal in the CCAA
Proceedings would severely interfere with the CCAA reorganization plan
and thus defeat the purpose of granting comity in the first place. The
Court adopted this line of reasoning and held that permitting EMA’s
claims against Clarke to continue would interfere with the Banro CCAA
Proceedings and defeat the purpose of granting comity to the CCAA
court.
However, EMA argued that there was no parallel proceeding in
Canada for the claims asserted against Clarke and that there was no
relationship between the restructuring of Banro and Clarke. The Court
dismissed EMA’s argument holding that permitting the claims against
Clarke to proceed would “undoubtedly interfere with the implementation
of the CCAA reorganization plan because that plan encompassed a release
of claims against Clarke.”
Ultimately, the Court dismissed both claims against Banro and Clarke
on grounds of international comity. The Court determined that the
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proceedings in the Canadian court satisfied fundamental standards of
procedural fairness by meeting the standard set forth in Allstate and did
not violate U.S. law or public policy because, under Second Circuit
precedent, the differences in U.S. and Canadian securities law do not
render Canadian courts an inadequate forum. Therefore, the appropriate
forum for EMA’s claims was the CCAA court and granting international
comity was appropriate.
EMA appealed the S.D.N.Y.’s decision to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals where the Court affirmed the district court’s decision. EMA Garp
Fund, L.P. v. Banro Corp., 783 F. App'x 82 (2d Cir. 2019).
These decisions illustrate that in the Second Circuit there is a strong
preference for granting dismissals based upon international comity when
the claims at hand arise out of foreign bankruptcy proceedings so long as
the foreign proceedings satisfy fundamental standards of procedural
fairness and do not violate U.S. law or public policy.

COMMERCIAL LEASES—RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL FOR A
TRANSFER TO A RELATED PARTY
The Tennessee Court of Appeals held that a lessee’s ‘right of first
refusal’ was not triggered when it was transferred by quitclaim deed
to a partnership consisting of the lessors. The offer must be bona
fide and from a third party. Kingston Springs Medical, LLC v. Francis, No.
M2018-01617-COA-R3-CV, 2020 WL 897977 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb 25,
2020).

Samuel Rule
In Kingston Springs Medical, LLC v. Francis, the Tennessee Court of
Appeals addressed whether or not a lessee’s right of first refusal was
triggered by the execution of a quitclaim deed conveyed to a partnership
that consisted of the lessors. The lessee, Kingston Springs Medical
(“Kingston Springs Medical”), claimed that it should be able to exercise
the purchase provision in the lease to match a “bona fide offer from an
unrelated third party” and purchase the property. However, the lessors,
Karl and Pamela Francis (“the Francises”), claimed that the transfer via
quitclaim deed did not trigger the lessee’s right of first refusal, and even if
it did trigger the provision, the transfer of the property was not to an
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“unrelated party”. Upon review, the Court concluded that the trial court
properly granted summary judgement in favor of the Francises.
In March 2001, the Francises purchased property in the Indian Pointe
Subdivision in Kingston Springs, Tennessee. While the deed only
conveyed the property to the Francises, they split the property with a good
friend, Jason West, (“Mr. West”). Mr. West paid half of the down payment,
half of the interest on the loan, and shared expenses that ran with the
property in consideration for half of the property via handshake
agreement. In 2001, Dr. Reggie Anderson, (“Dr. Anderson”), approached
the Francises and Mr. West about investing in a proposed medical office
building in Kingston Springs. Although they both declined the investment
opportunity, Mr. Francis did suggest that the Indian Pointe property could
be the site of the building. Dr. Anderson wanted to purchase the property,
but the Francises were only interested in leasing the property. Dr.
Anderson agreed to lease the property but crafted a provision in the lease
that gave himself the right to match any “bona fide offer from an
unrelated third-party to purchase the fee simple interest in the Leased
Premises.” Mr. West was not a party to the lease, and it is unclear whether
or not Dr. Anderson knew of Mr. West’s involvement. The lease was
between the Francises and Kingston Springs Medical, LLC, an entity Dr.
Anderson formed to develop and operate the medical office building.
In the fall of 2011, Dr. Anderson went to the bank to inquire about
refinancing his loan and learned that the property was no longer owned
by the Francises. The Francises had transferred the property to Indian
Pointe General Partners in 2008 for tax and estate planning purposes. The
deed was granted for “TEN DOLLARS, cash in hand paid, and other
good and valuable considerations.” Indian Pointe General Partners
included two partners, AAA Family Limited Partnership and JKW Family
Limited Partnership, each with fifty-percent share in the partnership. AAA
Family Limited Partnership consisted of the Francises and their children,
and JKW Family Limited Partnership consisted of Mr. West, his wife, and
their children. Dr. Anderson believed that this transfer of ownership
triggered his option under his lease to purchase the property. Therefore,
he sued the Francises, Mr. West, Indian Pointe General Partnership, AAA
Family Limited Partnership, and JKW Family Limited Partnership seeking
specific performance to purchase the property or damages. Dr. Anderson
claimed “misrepresentation by concealment” by the Francises for failing
to notify him of the transfer so that he could exercise his option to
purchase the property.

192

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 22

The Francises moved for summary judgement, claiming that this
transfer of land did not trigger the ‘right of first refusal’ provision in the
lease. Even if the court found that this transaction was a “bona fide offer”,
Indian Pointe General Partners could not be considered an “unrelated
third party” because the Francises owned half of the partnership that was
receiving the land in the transfer. Further, there was only nominal
consideration for the transfer of the land. The deed said that the
consideration for the transfer was “TEN DOLLARS, cash in hand paid,
and other good and valuable considerations,” and so this could not be a
“bona fide offer.” The trial court agreed with the Francises and granted
their motion for summary judgment. The trial court reasoned that that the
parties intended to create a ‘traditional garden-variety type of first refusal’
where the price and offer were determined by the offer of a third party.
On appeal, the Court agreed with the trial court and affirmed their
decision to grant the Francises motion for summary judgement. The
Appellate Court’s standard of review for a summary judgement on a lease
interpretation is de novo; thus, the trial court’s decision is not presumed
to be correct. When interpreting contracts, the Court must give effect to
the intention of the parties at the time of the contract, and they must
ascertain the plain language of the agreement. Applying these rules for
contract interpretation, the Court found that the first right of refusal
required a proposed sale of the property to an “unrelated third party”.
While Kingston Springs Medical argued that the provision is triggered by
any transfer besides those upon death, the Court used the plain language
of the agreement to conclude that the right of first refusal was only
triggered by an offer from a third party. To agree with Kingston Springs
Medical’s position, the Court would need to ignore the latter part of the
provision, which defined the right of first refusal as the right to “match
the purchase offer of the third party.”
Kingston Springs Medical further argued that the final sentence in the
provision made the transfer by the Francises trigger the right of first
refusal. The provision reads: “[a]ny transfer of the fee simple interest in
the Leased Premises (except to Lessee) shall be a conveyance subject to
the terms and conditions of this agreement.” Kingston Springs Medical
argued that the word “agreement” in the provision referred only to the
right of first refusal, and so the transfer made by the Francises triggered
the right of first refusal provision. However, the word “agreement”
appeared multiple times in this provision of the contract, and the Court
found that the parties intended it to mean the entire lease. Even Kingston
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Springs Medical acknowledged that the word “agreement” stated
elsewhere in the provision referred to the entire lease, and not just to the
right of refusal. Therefore, the last sentence of the provision did not
substantiate the assertion by Kingston Springs Medical that the right of
first refusal applied to all transfer of land.
The holding in this case is relevant to help practicing real estate and
estate-planning attorneys assist clients needing to transfer property into a
partnership for tax and estate planning purposes. If a client owns a leased
property with a tenant’s ‘right of first refusal’ provision for a bona fide
offer to buy the property, this property can be transferred to the owner’s
partnership without triggering this provision of the lease. However, the
lease can specify that it includes all transfers, in which case this does not
apply.
This case also affects attorneys who negotiate and draft commercial
leases. Practicing attorneys should be aware of the importance of this case
if they are negotiating on behalf of their client who wishes to enter into
a commercial lease and would like to add an option to purchase the
property. The lessee must specify that they would like the option to
purchase the property if there is any transfer of land, not just a bona fide
offer from a third party. Further, if a lessee wants to add a catch-all
provision clarifying that the right of first refusal is triggered by any transfer
of the property, there must be specific language at the end of the provision
to that extent.

